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INDELIBLE PUBLIC INTERESTS IN 
PROPERTY: THE PUBLIC TRUST  
AND THE PUBLIC FORUM 
Karl P. Baker* 
Dwight H. Merriam**
Abstract: In response to the ongoing debate over how much of the 
surface real estate reclaimed by the Big Dig should be devoted to open 
space, and how much to other uses, this Article examines two legal 
doctrines that are frequently implicated by plans for changes in use and 
disposition of publicly-owned property. While these doctrines stand on 
distinct historical and theoretical foundations and diverge from each 
other in many respects, there are important parallels between them in 
how they conceptualize the relationship between government’s power 
to regulate, control, and dispose of land it owns, and the rights 
belonging to what one scholar has called the “unorganized public” in 
that same property. On a more pragmatic level, commonality between 
these two doctrines arises from their applicability to the same physical 
spaces and their concern with the same types of governmental actions. 
Therefore, while both the courts and the academy have largely 
examined these doctrines separately, this Article employs a comparative 
analysis to better understand the relationship between government and 
the “unorganized public” with respect to publicly-owned property, and 
to more fully appreciate the limitations on the use of currently and 
formerly publicly-owned lands. 
Introduction 
 “Indelible” can be deªned in absolute or relative terms.1 The 
“indelible public interest” we address here is mostly of the latter type, 
difªcult but not impossible to extinguish. While the public trust is of-
                                                                                                                      
* J.D., Harvard Law School, anticipated 2007; M.C.P., Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology, anticipated 2007. 
** Partner, Robinson & Cole LLP; J.D., Yale University School of Law; M.R.P., Univer-
sity of North Carolina; B.A., University of Massachusetts. 
1 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language, 
Unabridged 1147 (Phillip B. Gove et al. eds., 1986) (deªning “indelible” as “1: that can-
not be removed, washed away, or erased; that cannot be effaced or obliterated: PERMA-
NENT, LASTING 2: that makes marks that cannot easily be removed”). 
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ten misunderstood as an inalienable public interest, there have been 
very few cases in which judicial review has found a modiªcation or 
disposal of public trust lands to be beyond the scope of the legisla-
ture’s power. As a derivative of the First Amendment, the public fo-
rum doctrine does categorically limit the ways in which government 
may restrict or regulate free speech in public forums, but it does not 
create permanent public forums that government cannot extinguish 
through sale or substantial modiªcation of the physical space.2 While 
not absolute, these sometimes indelible public interests in land may 
condition or even preclude implementation of certain plans for the 
disposition or development of publicly-owned land. 
I. How Indelible Public Interests Relate to the Big Dig 
 The question of how to utilize the surface real estate reclaimed by 
Boston’s Central Artery/Tunnel Project (Big Dig) continues to preoc-
cupy politicians, design professionals, and laypersons. These twenty-
seven acres in the heart of Boston offer opportunities rarely seen in this 
or any other city. Arguments over how to use this found land demon-
strate an overarching acknowledgement that it is imbued with the pub-
lic interest and the intrinsically indelible public rights of access and use. 
 One of the key debates thus far has addressed the appropriate 
balance between open space and development.3 Much of the wran-
gling has been about the idea that seventy-ªve percent of the re-
claimed surface area should be open space. One staunch supporter of 
the seventy-ªve percent requirement is John DeVillars, who in August 
of 1990, as Massachusetts Environmental Affairs Secretary, demanded 
that seventy-ªve percent of the reclaimed land be designated as open 
space, after stating publicly that he intended to “extract every last 
ounce of environmental and recreational beneªt that the law and 
                                                                                                                      
2 See infra Part II.B. 
3 The strict dichotomy between open space and development is not so clear. Article 49 
of the Boston Zoning Code, which covers the Central Artery Special District, allows for 
several different types of open space designations within what is now referred to as the 
Rose Kennedy Greenway. These include Urban Plaza Open Space Subdistricts, Recreation 
Open Space Subdistricts, and Parkland Open Space Subdistricts. The allowed uses in these 
“open space” subdistricts include building types such as restaurants, cafes, community and 
recreation centers, and a conservatory complex which could include “accessory ofªce, 
retail, educational, public assembly, Restaurant, and storage uses, and Cultural Uses.” Bos-
ton, Mass., Zoning Code art. 49 (1991), available at http://www.cityofboston.gov/bra/ 
pdf/ZoningCode/Article49.pdf. 
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common sense allow.”4 The seventy-ªve percent requirement was 
memorialized as “an essential mitigation measure” in the Secretary’s 
Certiªcate on the ªnal supplemental environmental impact report 
issued in 1991.5 DeVillars has remained a vocal supporter of the sev-
enty-ªve percent requirement. In an April 2002 op-ed piece in the 
Boston Globe, DeVillars acknowledged the controversy the seventy-ªve 
percent requirement had caused, but remained resolute stating, “if I 
had it to do over again, it would be 90 percent.”6 In addition, DeVil-
lars asserted that the seventy-ªve percent requirement and other envi-
ronmental mitigation measures “continue to represent the legally 
binding obligations of the Commonwealth.”7
 Later in 2002, another opinion—written by a partner at a local 
law ªrm—appeared in the Boston Globe, setting forth a different view 
of the seventy-ªve percent rule.8 This piece made several arguments 
against retaining the seventy-ªve percent rule. In terms of process-
oriented issues, the writer argued that the rule was not preceded by a 
planning process and engendered a stiºing inºexibility in the plan-
ning and design of the twenty-seven acres.9 In terms of the substantive 
concept behind the rule, the writer argued that it “treats open space 
as a commodity to be maximized when, in reality, urban open space is 
valuable only if it’s used.”10 By replicating the form of the old elevated 
highway, the writer argued that it “merely compounds a 50-year-old 
planning failure.”11 It was further suggested that opening up more 
land to development would help pay for the open spaces to be cre-
ated, given the challenges in funding the greenway.12 While the writer 
minimized the “supposed legal difªculties” of changing the seventy-
ªve percent requirement, he cautioned that “[s]hould a [new] 
greenway be created, and should it prove to be a mistake, the Massa-
chusetts constitution would require a two-thirds vote of the Legisla-
ture to undo it.”13
                                                                                                                      
4 Peter J. Howe, DeVillars to Weigh in with Artery Conditions, Boston Globe, Aug. 26, 
1990, § Metro, at 1. 
5 See John P. DeVillars, Editorial, What We Foresaw in 1991, Boston Globe, Apr. 20, 
2002, at A13. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Matthew J. Kiefer, Editorial, Changing the Rules for Artery Planning, Boston Globe, 
Oct. 7, 2002, at A17. 
9 See id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 See id. 
13 Id. 
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 The requirement for a two-thirds vote of the legislature is con-
tained in article 49 of the Massachusetts constitution.14 A supermajor-
ity is required to approve changes in the use or disposition of land or 
easements taken or acquired to further the rights of the people to 
“clean air and water, freedom from excessive and unnecessary noise, 
and the natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic qualities of their envi-
ronment.”15 Considering the purposes for which public parks are 
conceived, it is readily apparent how this provision could apply to fu-
ture plans to convert open space in the Rose Kennedy Greenway to a 
different use, whether private development or another public use 
such as a museum or police station. While the current version of arti-
cle 49 was ratiªed just thirty years ago, it builds on and follows the 
principles of the older prior public use doctrine. In the way it limits 
local governments and state agencies from changing the use of public 
parks without legislative authorization, it grants a kind of protection 
to parks that closely parallels protections carried out under the an-
cient “public trust doctrine” in other states. Furthermore, dedicated 
public parks, sidewalks, and roadways along the Rose Kennedy 
Greenway would all most likely qualify as traditional public forums, 
another form of public interest that might be difªcult to extinguish. 
II. The Public Trust Doctrine 
 At its core, the public trust doctrine stands for the proposition 
that certain resources are held in trust by the government for the 
beneªt of the “people” or the “public at large.” It is commonly stated 
that the emergence of the public trust doctrine can be traced to at 
least the sixth century AD, and that it has been a ªxture of the com-
mon law since at least the signing of the Magna Carta.16 While histori-
cally the public trust doctrine applied to navigable or tidal waterways, 
it has expanded in some jurisdictions to protect certain inland re-
                                                                                                                      
14 Mass. Const. art. XLIX. The 1972 adoption of article 97 annulled original article 
49 and adopted the present version in its place. Id. art. XCVII. 
15 Id. For a compilation of similar constitutional provisions from other states, see Bret 
Adams et al., Environmental and Natural Resources Provisions in State Constitutions, 22 J. Land 
Resources & Envtl. L. 73 (2002). 
16 See, e.g., Jose L. Fernandez, Untwisting the Common Law: Public Trust and the Massachu-
setts Colonial Ordinance, 62 Alb. L. Rev. 623, 626–27 (1998). Carol Rose has taken issue with 
this understanding, stating that “[a]lthough American and English jurists conªdently es-
poused the sovereign’s ‘trust’ ownership of the tidelands as if it dated at least from Magna 
Carta, strong evidence exists that the theory originated much more recently.” Carol Rose, 
The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 711, 728 (1986) (footnote omitted). 
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sources, such as public parks.17 While the limitations imposed on gov-
ernment by the public trust doctrine are often overstated and the 
public’s rights are not per se inalienable, the public trust does impose 
important restrictions on government in its ability to dispose of or 
change the use of publicly owned lands. 
A. The Jus Publicum 
 In one of his famous treatises, Lord Chief Justice Hale delineated 
three classes of interests in navigable waterways: the jus privatum, the 
jus publicum, and the jus regium.18 These can be translated, respec-
tively, as the “private right,” the “public right,” and the “royal right.”19 
Each term conforms to an idea still relevant in American public trust 
jurisprudence. The jus privatum can be understood as the rights 
granted to private individuals in public trust lands, whether in fee, 
licenses, or easements; these rights are subordinate to the jus publi-
cum.20 The jus publicum essentially represents the rights of the “unor-
ganized public”21 in public trust lands; these rights originally were 
deªned in the context of tidal waterways, essentially as access to 
ªshing and navigation.22 The jus regium is often left out of discussions 
of the public trust, but it is noteworthy: these rights essentially em-
body the state’s police power, encompassing the dual role of govern-
ment as trustee and police ofªcer with respect to public trust lands.23
 It is important to understand that the jus publicum is not per se 
inalienable.24 Historically, Parliament had the power to extinguish the 
jus publicum; after the American Revolution, this power passed to the 
                                                                                                                      
17 See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Re-
sources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 631, 649 (1986); Rose, supra 
note 16, at 730. 
18 See Lazarus, supra note 17, at 636. 
19 See id. 
20 See Donna Jalbert Patalano, Note, Police Power and the Public Trust: Prescriptive Zoning 
Through the Conºation of Two Ancient Doctrines, 28 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 683, 703 (2001). 
21 Carol Rose makes a useful distinction between the “unorganized public” and the 
“governmentally-organized public” in describing that nature of the rights implicated by 
the public trust doctrine and other doctrines that similarly touch upon “inherently public 
property.” Rose, supra note 16, at 721. 
22 See Patalano, supra note 20, at 703–04. 
23 See id. 
24 See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial In-
tervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471, 486 (1970) (“The ªrst point that must be clearly under-
stood is that there is no general prohibition against the disposition of trust properties, 
even on a large scale.”). 
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state legislatures.25 The role of the state legislature as trustee for the 
jus publicum is important in understanding the functioning of the 
public trust doctrine because local governments and state agencies 
are powerless without delegated authority from the legislature.26 
While there have been a few instances in which courts have prevented 
the legislature from alienating the jus publicum,27 there have been 
many more cases in which the alienation of the jus publicum by the 
legislature has been held permissible.28
B. Extinguishing the Public Trust? 
1. Can the Federal Government Extinguish the Public Trust? 
 It is “the settled law of this country” that the title to public trust 
lands—that is, tidal and navigable waterways—that vested in the States 
upon their entry into the Union, is subordinate to the authority of the 
federal government to regulate navigable waterways under the Com-
merce Clause.29 There is a split of opinion, however, on the relation-
ship between the rights of the unorganized public—the jus publicum— 
and the federal government’s authority. 
 The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts has held 
that “the federal government is as restricted as the Commonwealth in 
its ability to abdicate to private individuals its sovereign jus publicum in 
the land.”30 This court strongly endorsed the theory that the jus publi-
cum is inalienable, noting that “neither sovereign may alienate this 
land free and clear of the public trust” and that “[n]either the federal 
government nor the state may convey land below the low water mark 
to private individuals free of the sovereign’s jus publicum.”31
                                                                                                                      
25 Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 381 (1926). 
26 See Fafard v. Conservation Comm’n of Barnstable, 733 N.E.2d 66, 71 (Mass. 2000). 
27 See Appleby, 271 U.S. at 393–95 (interpreting Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 
387 (1892)). 
28 See id. at 384–91 (listing several cases under New York law where the jus publicum had 
been alienated); see also Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 424 N.E.2d 1092, 1099 
(Mass. 1981) (“The general view in this country is that constitutional considerations do 
not bar legislative grants of absolute rights in submerged lands, although a gross or egre-
gious disregard of the public interest would not survive constitutional challenge.”). 
29 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 479 (1988) (quoting Barney v. 
Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876)); see also Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at435. 
30 United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land Situated in Boston, 523 F. Supp. 120, 125 (D. 
Mass. 1981) (emphasis added). 
31 Id. at 124. 
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 However, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia has held that “[b]ecause . . . the United States’ power of emi-
nent domain is supreme to the State’s power to maintain tidal lands 
for the public trust, the . . . United States’ condemnation of these 
lands extinguishes the State’s public trust easement.”32 This court 
made note of the Massachusetts decision but maintained that 
“[b]ecause this Court believes it is bound by the Supremacy Clause of 
the United States Constitution to hold otherwise, . . . it respectfully 
declines to follow that court’s ruling.”33
 Since neither case has been overruled, the question of whether 
the federal government is subject to the jus publicum remains open.34
2. Local Governments Cannot Extinguish the Jus Publicum 
 Before acting with respect to public trust rights, local govern-
ments generally must obtain speciªc legislative permission. A Massa-
chusetts court recently explained the origin of that doctrine and 
clariªed how absolute the authority of the state legislature is in Mas-
sachusetts: 
[The] history of the origins of the Commonwealth’s public 
trust obligations and authority, as well as jurisprudence and 
legislation spanning two centuries, persuades us that only 
                                                                                                                      
32 United States v. 11.037 Acres of Land, 685 F. Supp. 214, 216 (N.D. Cal. 1988). 
33 Id. at 217. The court here also declined to follow its own precedent from two years 
earlier, City of Alameda v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 632 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Cal. 1986). In that 
case, the court cited 1.58 Acres of Land and held that, “[s]ince the State and the City both 
held the land subject to the public trust, the United States could take the land only subject 
to the public trust.” Id. at 341. 
34 Some courts have sided with the court in 1.58 Acres of Land, ªnding that the federal 
government is subject to the limitations of the jus publicum. See, e.g., United States v. Bur-
lington N. R.R. Co., 710 F. Supp. 1286, 1287 (D. Neb. 1989); In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 
F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980) (“Under the public trust doctrine, the State of Virginia and 
the United States have the right and the duty to protect and preserve the public’s interest 
in natural wildlife resources. Such right does not derive from ownership of the resources 
but from a duty owing to the people.”); see also District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 
F.2d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[N]either the Supreme Court nor the federal courts of 
appeals have expressly decided whether public trust duties apply to the United States. 
There appear to be only two district court cases which explicitly hold that this common-law 
rule applies to the federal government as well as to the states.”) (footnote omitted). Only 
one court has cited to 11.037 Acres of Land in support of the notion that the Supremacy 
Clause trumps the state’s public trust rights and it was not in a public trust case but rather 
in a case addressing the doctrine of prior public use. See United States v. Acquisition of 
0.3114 Cuerdas of Condemnation Land, 753 F. Supp. 50, 53 (D.P.R. 1990) (“The power of 
the federal government to condemn state land is well-settled. The State cannot limit or 
frustrate that power.”) (citation omitted). 
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the Commonwealth, or an entity to which the Legislature 
properly has delegated authority, may administer public trust 
rights. This authority derives from the passage of trusteeship 
and ownership of lands from one sovereign authority to the 
sovereign authority of the Commonwealth. Absent a grant of 
authority from the Commonwealth, a municipality may not 
claim powers to act on behalf of public trust rights.35
 Given that local governments are merely instruments of the state 
and may only exercise powers granted to them by the state, this state-
ment does not seem surprising. Especially when applied to navigable 
waterways, one can see the rationale in limiting local control. With re-
spect to such activities as regulating town beaches and public parks, one 
might begin to question the wisdom of vesting paramount control of 
the state in dictating the uses of these spaces. Nevertheless, with respect 
to the public trust, it is clear that the trustee is the state legislature.36
3. Trustee Obligations of States with Respect to the Public Trust 
a. Illinois Central: The Outlier of Public Trust Jurisprudence? 
 Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois,37 an 1892 Supreme Court 
decision, is widely cited as the most inºuential decision in American 
public trust jurisprudence.38 In holding “inoperative” an act of the 
Illinois Legislature that purported to convey title to one thousand 
acres of submerged lands in the Chicago harbor to a railroad com-
pany,39 Illinois Central represents one of the few instances where a 
court has invalidated an act of the legislature under the public trust 
doctrine.40 The decision must be read in light of the extraordinary 
terms of the grant itself, acknowledged in the Court’s opinion: “We 
cannot, it is true, cite any authority where a grant of this kind has 
been held invalid, for we believe that no instance exists where the 
                                                                                                                      
35 Fafard v. Conservation Comm’n of Barnstable, 733 N.E.2d 66, 71 (Mass. 2000) 
(footnote omitted). 
36 See id. 
37 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
38 For an in-depth discussion of the facts in Illinois Central and the mythology sur-
rounding that case, see Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American 
Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 799 (2004). 
39 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 454, 460. 
40 See Sax, supra note 24, at 489 (“The Supreme Court [in Illinois Central] . . . wrote one 
of the very few opinions in which an express conveyance of trust lands has been held to be 
beyond the power of a state legislature.”). 
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harbor of a great city and its commerce have been allowed to pass into 
the control of any private corporation.”41
 In Appleby v. New York, decided thirty-four years after Illinois Cen-
tral, the Supreme Court interpreted Illinois Central as allowing the 
grant of full fee to submerged waterways off Manhattan Island.42 The 
Appleby Court read Illinois Central as having prohibited only the “gross 
perversion” of the public trust and “abdication of sovereign govern-
mental power,” not the alienation per se of the jus publicum.43
b. Massachusetts 
 The long and convoluted history of the Massachusetts public 
trust doctrine begins with the Colonial Ordinance of 1647.44 This or-
dinance granted private property rights in the land between the high 
and low tide marks—known as the “ºats”—to the upland property 
owners.45 While the Colony did retain an interest in the ºats similar to 
an easement for navigation, this Ordinance can be viewed as an alien-
ation of the public trust since it departed from the law of England, 
which had been brought to the Colony and did not allow private own-
ership of the ºats.46
 Some Massachusetts decisions have suggested that the public 
trust is inalienable. For example, in Newburyport Redevelopment Author-
ity v. Commonwealth, a Massachusetts Appeals Court stated that “land 
below the natural low water mark is impressed with a public trust, 
which gives the public’s representatives an interest and responsibility 
in its development which cannot be extinguished.”47 This formulation 
is not in conformity, however, with the opinion of the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court (SJC), which has accepted the Appleby inter-
pretation of Illinois Central—that is, public trust lands are not inalien-
able. The SJC opinion was expressed in response to issues raised in 
Boston Waterfront Development Corp. v. Commonwealth, which was contro-
versial when decided because it held that a parcel of private property 
                                                                                                                      
41 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 455. 
42 271 U.S. 364, 393–94 (1926). 
43 See id. at 393; see also Sax, supra note 24, at 489 (“But the Court did not actually pro-
hibit the disposition of trust lands to private parties; its holding was much more limited.”). 
44 The Ordinance of 1647 is sometimes referred to as the Ordinance of 1641. See 
Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 67 (1851). 
45 Id. at 67–68. 
46 See Sax, supra note 24, at 487. 
47 401 N.E.2d 118, 141 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted). 
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along the Boston waterfront was held subject to a “condition subse-
quent that it be used for the public purpose for which it was 
granted.”48 Many worried that this decision clouded the title of much 
of the valuable real estate in downtown Boston that at one time was 
waterfront property, and presumably under the common law, re-
mained a part of the public trust.49
 Many of the legal uncertainties raised by this case were eventually 
resolved with the exclusion of “landlocked tidelands” from the pur-
view of the regulations promulgated under chapter 91 of the General 
Laws of Massachusetts—the codiªcation of the public trust doctrine 
in Massachusetts.50 This had important implications for much of the 
land under which the Central Artery now ºows, since much of this 
land was at one time part of the tidal ºats subject to the common law 
public trust doctrine.51 The Massachusetts Senate asked the SJC to 
comment on the constitutionality of a draft of chapter 91, which ex-
plicitly extinguished the jus publicum in parts of downtown Boston that 
were historically impressed by the public trust, but no longer adjacent 
to or related to the operation of the waterfront.52 The SJC found “no 
hesitancy in accepting the legislative conclusion that it is substantially 
in the public interest that such land be free from any claim of a public 
trust and any other vestigial interest of the Commonwealth.”53
                                                                                                                      
48 393 N.E.2d 356, 367 (Mass. 1979). 
49 See Kirsten Hoffman, Note, Waterfront Redevelopment as an Urban Revitalization Tool: 
Boston’s Waterfront Redevelopment Plan, 23 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 471, 487 (1999). 
50 See id. at 491; see also Mass. Regs. Code tit. 310, §§ 9.02, 9.04(2) (1987). These regu-
lations apply to “all ªlled tidelands, except for landlocked tidelands.” Mass. Regs. Code tit. 
310, § 9.04(2) (emphasis added). “Landlocked tidelands” are deªned as: 
any ªlled tidelands which on January 1, 1984 were entirely separated by a 
public way or interconnected public ways from any ºowed tidelands, except 
for that portion of such ªlled tidelands which are presently located: 
 (a) within 250 feet of the high water mark, or 
 (b) within any Designated Port Area. Said public way or ways shall also be 
deªned as landlocked tidelands, except for any portion thereof which is pres-
ently within 250 feet of the high water mark. 
Mass. Regs. Code tit. 310, § 9.02. 
51 The Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection regulation exempts 
from chapter 91 regulation “landlocked tidelands,” deªned as ªlled tidelands separated 
from the waterfront by a public way and more than 250 feet from the water’s edge as of 
January 1, 1984. See Mass. Regs. Code tit. 310, § 9.02. Much of the Central Artery runs 
through areas that were at one time either part of the tidal ºats or underwater lands, but 
are now farther than 250 feet from the waterfront. 
52 See Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 424 N.E.2d 1092, 1096 (Mass. 1981); 
Hoffman supra note 49, at 488. 
53 Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 424 N.E.2d at 1103. 
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 The SJC recognized two conditions that must be met in order for 
the alienation of submerged lands to be upheld. First, in order for the 
Commonwealth to “abandon, release, or extinguish the public inter-
est in submerged land,” there must be explicit legislation that details 
the particular property involved, the interest being surrendered, and 
an acknowledgment of the public use served by the transfer.54 In Mas-
sachusetts, “[s]imilar principles properly apply to any relinquishment 
or surrender of a public interest in real estate.”55
 Second, in Massachusetts, dispositions of public assets must be 
“for a valid public purpose, and, where there may be beneªts to pri-
vate parties, those private beneªts must not be primary but merely 
incidental to the achievement of the public purpose.”56 While legisla-
tive and administrative determinations of the public interest are given 
some deference, these determinations are subject to judicial review.57 
In Massachusetts, the “paramount test” for whether the public pur-
pose requirement is satisªed is a two pronged inquiry that looks for 
(1) the existence of a direct public beneªt that reaches “a signiªcant 
part of the public;” and (2) “whether the aspects of private advantage 
. . . are reasonably incidental to carrying out a public purpose.”58
III. Application of Public Trust Principles to Parks 
A. Public Parks and the Public Trust 
 States differ as to whether the public trust doctrine applies to 
public parks.59 The law in some states, including Massachusetts, is 
consistent, at least in formal terms, with the ruling of the Connecticut 
Supreme Court that the public trust doctrine applied to shorefront 
property is “entirely separate and distinct” from doctrines that protect 
parks.60 In other states, such as Illinois and New York, the courts have 
at least ostensibly applied the same doctrine to parks as to tidelands. 
Despite the formal differences, however, the prior public use doctrine 
                                                                                                                      
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 1101 (“The question whether a particular legislative act, or an administrative 
decision pursuant to statutory authorization, serves a public purpose is for the Legislature 
to determine, and, although that legislative determination is entitled to great deference, it 
is not wholly beyond judicial scrutiny.”). 
58 Id. at 1100–01 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
59 See Serena M. Williams, Sustaining Urban Green Spaces: Can Public Parks Be Protected 
Under the Public Trust Doctrine?, 10 S.C. Envtl. L.J. 23, 33 (2002). 
60 Leydon v. Town of Greenwich, 777 A.2d 552, 564 n.17 (Conn. 2001). 
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protects parks in Massachusetts in substantially the same way that the 
public trust doctrine protects parks in Illinois and New York.61 The 
same general concepts are controlling in both regimes: (1) the re-
quirement of legislative permission to divert or alienate park space; 
and (2) the importance of formal dedication in determining whether 
extra protection applies to public parks.62
B. Illinois 
 Illinois is one of the few states to have judicially expanded the 
public trust doctrine to public parks. This was ªrst accomplished in 
Paepcke v. Public Building Co., a 1970 Illinois Supreme Court decision 
holding that citizens had standing as beneªciaries of the jus publicum 
to challenge a diversion of public park space.63 In Paepcke, the plain-
tiffs challenged a diversion of park space for the construction of pub-
lic school buildings.64 The court made clear that the public trust doc-
trine did not prohibit per se the diversion or alienation of public trust 
property,65 and focused on the question of whether or not the legisla-
ture had granted sufªcient authority to the city agencies named as 
defendants in the action, such that those agencies could divert park 
space to build schools.66 The court concluded that the legislation was 
“sufªciently broad, comprehensive and deªnite” to allow the con-
struction of the schools and afªrmed the dismissal of the complaint.67 
Since Paepcke, the Illinois courts have continued to show deference, 
and not a single government act with respect to public parks has been 
found to violate the public trust doctrine.68 In the meantime, courts 
have found permissible diversions of parks for use as a golf course,69 a 
driving range,70 parking lots for Soldier Field,71 and the construction 
of a highway bridge.72
                                                                                                                      
61 See infra Part III.B–C. 
62 See infra Part III.B–C. 
63 Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm’n, 263 N.E.2d 11, 18 (Ill. 1970). 
64 Id. at 13. 
65 Id. at 18 (“If we understand plaintiffs’ position correctly they do not contend, as far 
as the rights of the public in public trust lands are concerned, that the legislature could 
never, by appropriate action, change or reallocate the use in any way. (This would be con-
trary to well established precedent.)” (citations omitted)). 
66 See id. at 17–18. 
67 Id. at 19, 21. 
68 See, e.g., Friends of the Parks v. Chi. Park Dist., 786 N.E.2d 161, 171 (Ill. 2003). 
69 Clement v. Chi. Park Dist., 449 N.E.2d 81, 83–84 (Ill. 1983). 
70 Clement v. O’Malley, 420 N.E.2d 533, 540 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981). 
71 See Friends of the Parks, 786 N.E.2d at 163, 164. 
72 Wade v. Kramer, 459 N.E.2d 1025, 1026, 1029 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). 
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 The importance of formal dedications in determining whether or 
not public parks are protected under the public trust doctrine was un-
derscored by an Illinois Appellate Court decision ªnding the doctrine 
inapplicable to a parcel of land that was coded on the city land use plan 
as “Public Park/Open Space.”73 There had never been a formal dedica-
tion of the property as a public park and the court characterized the 
property as “an empty lot with drainage improvements.”74
C. New York 
 New York has perhaps gone furthest in enforcing the public trust 
doctrine with respect to public parks.75 In Friends of Van Cortlandt Park 
v. City of New York, the State’s highest court held that the city of New 
York could not construct a water treatment plant in a public park be-
cause it had not received “the direct and speciªc approval of the State 
Legislature, plainly conferred.”76 This was true despite the recogni-
tion by the court that “the water treatment plant plainly serves an im-
portant public purpose,” and the fact that the diversion would only be 
temporary.77 The court quoted an earlier case where a New York 
court invalidated a ten-year lease of a building in Central Park in ex-
plaining the absolute prohibitions against alienation or diversion of 
park space by park commissioners: “‘[Central Park] must be kept free 
from intrusion of every kind which would interfere in any degree with 
its complete use for this end [as a public park].’”78
 The question of what qualiªes as a “park use” was addressed in 
795 Fifth Avenue Corp. v. New York, an action challenging a park com-
missioner’s decision to allow construction of a restaurant pavilion 
near the southeast corner of Central Park.79 The court held that this 
use did not violate the public trust doctrine and that it was within the 
powers granted to the commissioner by the legislature because it 
                                                                                                                      
73 See Timothy Christian Sch. v. Vill. of W. Springs, 675 N.E.2d 168, 174–75 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1996). 
74 Id. at 174. 
75 In New York, the public trust doctrine as it applies to parks is codiªed in General 
City Law section 20: “the rights of a city in and to its waterfront, ferries, bridges, wharf 
property, land under water, public landings, wharves, docks, streets, avenues, parks, and all 
other public places, are hereby declared to be inalienable.” N.Y. Gen. City Law § 20 
(2003). 
76 Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 750 N.E.2d 1050, 1055 (N.Y. 
2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
77 Id. at 1054–55. 
78 Id. at 1053 (quoting Williams v. Gallatin, 128 N.E. 121, 123 (N.Y. 1920)). 
79 795 Fifth Ave. Corp. v. City of New York, 242 N.Y.S.2d 961 (N.Y. Sup. 1963). 
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qualiªed as a “park use,” and thus the park commissioner’s plan 
“merely involve[d] a change from one proper park use to another.”80 
The court concluded that the proposed structure was a park use be-
cause it “offer[ed] substantial satisfactions to the public, which would 
only be possible in a park setting.”81 This reasoning was explained 
through analogy to other park uses that could exist outside the park, 
such as ice skating or Shakespearean theatre, but were enhanced by 
location inside the park.82
 With respect to the proposed pavilion, the court noted that “the 
savor of a meal or evening coffee, a snack or an aperitif, in the park 
setting is a unique one.”83 The court dismissed the idea that the 
elimination of green space implied a violation of the public trust, stat-
ing that the “transformation of parklands from their natural state to 
other park uses—e. g., into recreation areas, such as tennis courts and 
bridle paths, bandstands, beaches or open-air theatres—does not in-
volve a violation of park purposes.”84 Interestingly, the court also dis-
cussed the design and character of the structure as a relevant factor.85 
In enthusiastic praise, the court stated that the proposed pavilion had 
“a ‘feel’ to it—which expresses joy, openness and light, and, according 
to the expert testimony, it is of a type which has long been found as 
part of parks in this country as well as western Europe. . . . It is as 
natural to the park as a boat house is to a lake.”86 As a ªnal endorse-
ment, the court stated that “[i]n all likelihood it will be considered in 
the future as one of the ªnest of its kind in the United States.”87
 Similar to Illinois courts, New York courts attach signiªcance to 
formal dedications in determining whether the public trust doctrine 
applies. This was demonstrated in a recent controversy arising out of 
the city of New York’s plan to use community gardens as sites for the 
development of affordable housing.88 The trial court dismissed the 
action to prevent the diversion on the grounds that “community gar-
dens are not considered dedicated Parkland pursuant to the Public 
Trust Doctrine.”89 In its decision, the court explained the many ways 
                                                                                                                      
80 Id. at 968. 
81 Id. at 969. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 968. 
85 795 Fifth Ave. Corp., 242 N.Y.S.2d at 968. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Green Guerillas v. City of New York, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 22, 2002, at 28. 
89 Id. 
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parks could be dedicated and become subject to the public trust doc-
trine, such as by private donation, formal public declaration, and 
“implied” dedication where “there is evidence of an unequivocal in-
tent on the part of the municipality . . . to abandon the property and 
devote it to public use.”90 The court noted that “an inference that a 
dedication has taken place may properly be drawn where the land was 
speciªcally purchased with the intention of constructing a park and 
the changes were indicated on City maps and the record map.”91 
However, the court found no evidence that the city had taken such 
actions, noting that “[t]here have been no changes to any maps or 
public records.”92 This was despite the fact that the city “assisted with 
the care and security of these gardens.”93
D. Massachusetts—Prior Public Use Doctrine 
 While the Massachusetts courts have not explicitly applied the pub-
lic trust doctrine to parklands, at least one commentator has noted that 
the Massachusetts courts have applied “public trust principles” to parks 
through its application of the prior public use doctrine.94 While differ-
ent in name, this doctrine has substantially the same requirements for 
alienating or diverting public parks to other uses. 
 The prior public use doctrine is rooted in the idea that cities are 
administrative conveniences of the state.95 An important considera-
tion in deciding if the prior public use doctrine applies is whether the 
use of the property is one that is classiªed as a proprietary or gov-
ernmental function of the local government. Property held in the 
proprietary capacity of a municipality “is not subject to the unre-
stricted authority of the Legislature, and no person can deprive it of 
such property rights against its will, except by the exercise of eminent 
domain with payment of full compensation.”96 Conversely, property 
held by the municipality in its governmental capacity “is subject to 
                                                                                                                      
90 Id. (citations omitted). 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 See Heather J. Wilson, Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine in Massachusetts Land Law, 
11 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 839, 865–66 (1984). 
95 See Higginson v. Slattery, 99 N.E. 523, 524 (Mass. 1912) (“Cities and towns are terri-
torial subdivisions of the State created as public corporations for convenience in the ad-
ministration of government. They exercise only the powers which have been conferred by 
express enactment of the Legislature or by necessary implication from undoubted pre-
rogatives vested in them.”). 
96 Id. at 525. 
290 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 32:275 
legislative control. It may be transferred to some other agency of gov-
ernment charged with the same duties, or it may be devoted to other 
public purposes.”97 The maintenance of public parks is considered a 
governmental function and therefore subject to the authority of the 
legislature.98 The reasoning behind this classiªcation was spelled out 
in Higginson v. Slattery: 
[T]he dominant aim in the establishment of public parks 
appears to be the common good of mankind rather than the 
special gain or private beneªt of a particular city or town. 
The healthful and civilizing inºuence of parks in and near 
congested areas of population is of more than local interest 
and becomes a concern of the state under modern condi-
tions. . . . We should hesitate to say that the state would be 
powerless to exert compulsion if a city or town should be 
found so unmindful of the demands of humanity as to fail to 
provide itself with adequate public grounds.99
 Similar to the public trust doctrine applied to parklands in Illi-
nois and New York, “plain and explicit legislation” is required in Mas-
sachusetts to divert the parkland to another “inconsistent public 
use.”100 The court in Higginson granted an injunction prohibiting the 
construction of a school in the Back Bay Fens area after ªnding that 
“statutes upon which the respondents rely do not show a legislative 
intent to permit the erection of the kind of building here pro-
posed.”101 This decision was made despite the fact that the legislature 
had passed a statute allowing for the “erection of a building for the 
High School of Commerce within the limits of the Back Bay Fens.”102 
The court arrived at its seemingly untenable conclusion on the basis 
that about twenty-one percent of the proposed building would be util-
ized as administrative ofªces.103 This underscored how the require-
ment for explicit legislation has been more “stringently applied” with 
respect to public parks than to other uses because of “[t]he policy of 
the Commonwealth has been to add to the common-law inviolability 
                                                                                                                      
97 Id. 
98 See id. at 525–26. 
99 Id. at 527. 
100 Robbins v. Dep’t of Pub. Works, 244 N.E.2d 577, 579 (Mass. 1969). 
101 Higginson, 99 N.E. at 527. 
102 Id. at 528 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
103 Id. 
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of parks express prohibition against encroachment by buildings, 
highways, steam or street railways.”104
 Formal dedications are also important in determining the pro-
tections afforded to public parks in Massachusetts. In Muir v. City of 
Leominster, for example, the court held that a parcel that had been 
used for several decades as a playground was not subject to the prior 
public use doctrine because it had not been “devoted to one public 
use,” largely because there had been “no formal dedication by the city 
of this area as park land.”105 Private charitable dedications to park use 
are governed somewhat differently and create generally greater re-
strictions on alienation.106
IV. Public Forum Issues 
 The public forum doctrine operates to guarantee First Amend-
ment rights of free speech. Like the public trust doctrine and the 
prior public use doctrine, it limits the ability of government to control 
and make changes to publicly-owned property. 
A. Development—Linkage to Public Trust 
 The public forum doctrine is a relatively recent incarnation. 
Some have pinpointed its origin to an article written by Professor 
Harry Kalven in 1965;107 the Supreme Court has identiªed its 1939 
                                                                                                                      
104 See id. at 526. There is also a statutory restriction on buildings in public parks: 
 Land taken for or held as a park under this chapter shall be forever kept 
open and maintained as a public park, and no building which exceeds six 
hundred square feet in area on the ground shall be erected on a common or 
park dedicated to the use of the public without leave of the general court; 
but, except in parks in Boston and in parks comprising less than one hundred 
acres in extent, structures for shelter, refreshment and other purposes may be 
erected of such material and in such places as, in the opinion of the ªre 
commissioners, if any, do not endanger buildings beyond the limits of such 
park. The superior court shall have jurisdiction in equity, upon petition of 
not less than ten taxable inhabitants of the city or town in which such com-
mon or park is located, to restrain the erection of a building on a common or 
park in violation of this section. 
• Mass Gen. Laws ch. 45, § 7 (2002). 
105 Muir v. City of Leominster, 317 N.E.2d 121, 215 (Mass. App. Ct. 1974). 
106 See, e.g., Dunphy v. Commonwealth, 331 N.E.2d 883, 886–87 (Mass. 1975). Regret-
tably, space limitations preclude discussion of the differences. 
107 Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 1, 12; see, e.g., John T. Haggerty, Note, Begging and the Public Forum Doctrine in the First 
Amendment, 34 B.C. L. Rev. 1121, 1128 (1993). 
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decision Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organizations as the beginning 
of the doctrine’s formation.108
 The parallels between the conceptual framework of the public 
forum doctrine and the public trust doctrine are discernible early in 
the public forum doctrine’s development. For example, Kalven de-
scribes “a kind of First-Amendment easement” on certain types of 
public property,109 which sounds similar to the jus publicum. Likewise, 
in the following well-known and frequently cited passage from Hague 
v. Committee for Industrial Organizations, public trust is linked with 
speech: 
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have 
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public 
and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of as-
sembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and dis-
cussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public 
places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, 
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.110
B. What Is a Public Forum? 
 While public forum issues most often arise with respect to pub-
licly-owned property, a public forum can also exist on privately-owned 
property.111 Moreover, not all publicly-owned property is a protected 
public forum.112
 There are three general categories of public forums: (1) the tradi-
tional or “quintessential” public forum; (2) the designated public fo-
rum; and (3) the nonpublic forum.113 While this Article concerns itself 
primarily with deªning traditional public forums, a brief sketch of 
                                                                                                                      
108 Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 778 (1996) 
(Souter, J., concurring) (“[I]t took over 40 years, from Hague v. Committee for Industrial 
Organization . . . to Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., for the public forum cate-
gory to settle out . . . .”) (internal citations omitted). 
109 See Kalven, supra note 107, at 13; see also Haggerty, supra note 107, at 1128. 
110 Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
111 See, e.g., Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. Local Joint Executive Bd., 257 F.3d 937, 
948 (9th Cir. 2001). 
112 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) 
(“[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply because it is 
owned or controlled by the government . . . . [T]he State, no less than a private owner of 
property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is 
lawfully dedicated.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
113 See id. at 45–46. 
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these three classes and their general characteristics may still be helpful. 
Traditional public forums are deªned as places that have a long tradi-
tion of being places of free expression and assembly.114 Public streets 
and parks are the most important examples of traditional or quintes-
sential public forums.115 In these areas, the ability “of the State to limit 
expressive activity [is] sharply circumscribed.”116 Designated public fo-
rums are properties on which, by some voluntary act, the government 
has allowed free public expression.117 Examples of such designated 
public forums are meeting facilities, school board meetings, and mu-
nicipal theaters.118 Nonpublic forums are essentially public properties 
that are neither traditional nor designated public forums.119 In non-
public forums, speech restrictions only need to be “reasonable.”120
C. Extinguishing Forums 
 Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence in International Society for 
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, afªrmatively answered this basic ques-
tion of whether a public forum can be extinguished: 
In some sense the government always retains authority to 
close a public forum, by selling the property, changing its 
physical character, or changing its principal use. Otherwise 
the State would be prohibited from closing a park, or elimi-
nating a street or sidewalk, which no one has understood the 
public forum doctrine to require.121
 While there may be no such thing as a permanent public forum, 
a State’s actions must conform to a certain standard in order for the 
forum to be extinguished.122 Traditional public forums—such as 
parks and streets—are “deªned by the objective characteristics of the 
                                                                                                                      
114 Id. at 37. 
115 See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480–81 (1988) (rejecting an argument that these 
were clichés); Hague, 307 U.S. at 515–16. 
116 Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45. 
117 See id. 
118 See id. at 45–46. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 46. 
121 505 U.S. 672, 699–700 (1992). 
122 See First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1124 (10th Cir. 
2002) (“The government cannot simply declare the First Amendment status of property 
regardless of its nature and its public use.”). 
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property.”123 Whether or not a given area is considered a public fo-
rum “hinges on a case-by-case inquiry in which no single factor is dis-
positive.”124 In Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., the Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit refuted the argument that private prop-
erty that was held open to the public should always be considered a 
public forum: 
Such an argument could be made with respect to almost 
every retail and service establishment in the county, regard-
less of size or location. In addition, . . . to ªnd state action 
based upon the mere fact that private property was open to 
the public, would constitute an unwarranted infringement of 
long-settled rights of private property owners protected by 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments . . . . [Furthermore, it] 
would transform many religious property owners into state 
actors, a conclusion without any support in the case law. 
Thus, Plaintiffs’ allegations that the Plaza serves as a park 
where the public is invited to gather, relax, and enjoy the 
open space are irrelevant.125
 There are three primary factors that courts look to in determin-
ing whether a forum has been extinguished: (1) the ownership inter-
est retained by the government; (2) the changes made to the physical 
nature or purpose of the property; and (3) the property’s function. 
1. Ownership Interest Retained by the Government 
 Whether or not the government retains a property interest is an 
important factor in determining if a public forum has been extin-
guished. Easements are constitutionally protected property interests 
and the retention of a public easement can perpetuate a public fo-
rum.126 The importance of property interests in forum analysis was 
underscored by a series of recent cases respecting the forum status of 
the plaza fronting the headquarters of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints (Church) in Salt Lake City.127 Prior to becoming a 
                                                                                                                      
123 Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998); see also First Uni-
tarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1125. 
124 United Church of Christ v. Gateway Econ. Dev. Corp., 383 F.3d 449, 453 (6th Cir. 
2004). 
125 316 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1225 n.24 (D. Utah 2004) (emphasis added) (internal cita-
tions and quotation marks omitted). 
126 See First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1122–23. 
127 See id.; Utah Gospel Mission, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1232. 
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plaza, this area had been a section of Main Street and a traditional 
public forum.128 The Church negotiated for the purchase of this 
property from the City. Under the terms of the conveyance, the City 
retained a pedestrian easement for public passage through the 
plaza.129 In the ªrst round of litigation concerning the forum status of 
this plaza, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit determined 
that, despite terms in the conveyance specifying that the easement was 
not a public forum, a traditional public forum survived on the por-
tion of the plaza covered by the easement. 130
 After this adverse decision, the City and the Church negotiated a 
new deal whereby the City conveyed its easement to the Church at a 
price that was a multiple of the appraised value.131 After this deal, the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Utah found that the relinquish-
ment of the easement helped extinguish the public forum, conclud-
ing that “[t]he Property at issue is now an entirely private, Church-
owned Plaza devoid of any government property interests that could 
possibly create a public forum.”132
2. The Importance of Physical Characteristics 
 Physical characteristics and design of space are important con-
siderations in forum analysis. For instance, in Citizens to End Animal 
Suffering & Exploitation, Inc. v. Faneuil Hall Marketplace, Inc., the U.S. 
                                                                                                                      
128 See First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1117. 
129 The reservation provided in pertinent part: 
Pedestrian Access and Passage: Subject to the conditions, limitations, and restric-
tions set forth in section 2 hereinbelow, Grantor reserves an easement over 
and across the surface of the Property for pedestrian access and passage only . . . . 
Grantee shall not erect any perimeter fences or gates on the Property along 
the North Temple or South Temple rights of way . . . . Grantor may allow the 
general public to use this easement for pedestrian access and passage only, 
but all use of this easement shall be subject to the conditions, limitations, and 
restrictions described hereinbelow. 
Id. at 1118 (emphasis added) (omissions in original). The City also retained a right of re-
verter conditioned upon the maintenance of a view corridor through the plaza. In the 
second round of litigation, the court held that this right of reverter was a future interest 
that was not compensable under the Fifth Amendment and through analogy concluded 
that it was not a sufªcient property interest for the creation of a public forum. Utah Gospel 
Mission, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1232–35. 
130 First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1118, 1132–33 (“Right to Prevent Uses Other Than 
Pedestrian Passage: Nothing in the reservation or use of this easement shall be deemed to 
create or constitute a public forum, limited or otherwise, on the Property.”). 
131 Utah Gospel Mission, 316 F. Supp. 2d at 1214, 1225, 1228. 
132 Id. at 1235. 
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District Court for the District of Massachusetts noted the lack of 
clearly distinguishable boundaries between the publicly-owned and 
privately-owned property as relevant to its forum analysis: 
The similarity of the Marketplace to a municipal park is un-
derscored by the absence of any discernable boundaries be-
tween the Marketplace and the immediately-adjacent, public 
areas, such as Faneuil Hall Square. The absence of such 
boundaries has proven to be critical in distinguishing be-
tween purely private shopping centers and shopping centers 
to which the Constitution applies.133
 Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently 
looked at the physical character of the sidewalk as one of “two key rea-
sons” why the sidewalk in question was a public forum.134 The case in-
volved the status of a privately-owned sidewalk that ran through a sports 
complex housing the Cleveland Indians baseball stadium.135 
Speciªcally, the court noted how it “blends into the urban grid, borders 
the [public] road, and looks just like any public sidewalk.”136 The court 
discounted the importance of landscaping that “roughly delineated” 
some portions of the sidewalk from the public realm, concluding that 
“the average observer would be unfamiliar with the geographic 
signiªcance of this sporadic vegetation.”137 Apparently, this conclusion 
was buttressed by the fact that “the public and Gateway sidewalks are 
made of the same materials and share the same design.”138
 In some cases, a physical transformation may be so dramatic as to 
extinguish the public forum in property still owned by the govern-
ment. For example, in Hawkins v. City & County of Denver, the Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that in constructing a covered 
walkway leading to a performing arts complex, “Denver has altered 
the physical characteristics and function of the former public street 
sufªciently to remove its status as a traditional public forum.”139 The 
court noted that “[t]he government may, by changing the physical 
                                                                                                                      
133 745 F. Supp. 65, 71 n.13 (D. Mass. 1990). 
134 United Church of Christ v. Gateway Econ. Dev. Corp., 383 F.3d 449, 452 (6th Cir. 
2004). 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Hawkins v. City & County of Denver, 170 F.3d 1281, 1288 (10th Cir. 1999). 
2005] Indelible Public Interests in Property 297 
nature of its property, alter it to such an extent that it no longer re-
tains its public forum status.”140
3. Function 
 As a criterion for determining whether a public forum survives, 
“function” is closely aligned with questions about the modiªcation of 
physical characteristics. In the above-described case relating to the 
sidewalk outside the Cleveland Indians’ stadium, the court looked to 
how the sidewalk functioned as “a public thoroughfare” as one of the 
“key reasons” the sidewalk remained a public forum.141 The court 
noted that “[b]y design, the Gateway Sidewalk contributes to the 
City’s downtown transportation grid and is open to the public for 
general pedestrian passage. Indeed, rather than leading to the rest of 
the Complex, the Gateway Sidewalk encircles it as a through route.”142
 Conversely, the court in Hawkins noted that the Galleria did not 
“form part of Denver’s automotive, bicycle or pedestrian transporta-
tion grid, for it is closed to vehicles, and pedestrians do not generally 
use it as a throughway to another destination. Rather, the Galleria’s 
function is simply to permit ingress to and egress from the . . . various 
complexes.”143
Conclusion 
 The public trust doctrine and public forum doctrine both imply 
that there is infused in certain property a public interest that may only 
be extinguished when certain conditions are met. While the two doc-
trines diverge in deªning these conditions—for example, legislative 
authority is an important consideration under the public trust doc-
trine but not at all under the public forum doctrine—the central no-
tion of a public right that the government is bound to respect is 
found in both. 
 In her article The Comedy of the Commons,144 Carol Rose offers a 
way of reconciling the two doctrines. First, she argues that “there lies 
outside purely private property and government-controlled ‘public 
property’ a distinct class of ‘inherently public property’ which is fully 
                                                                                                                      
140 Id. at 1287. 
141 United Church of Christ, 383 F.3d at 452. 
142 Id. 
143 Hawkins, 170 F.3d at 1287. 
144 Rose, supra note 16. 
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controlled by neither government nor private agents.”145 Rose ex-
plores the apparent incongruity between “inherently public property” 
and the classical economic property rights theory, which holds that 
property rights exist because the right to exclude encourages invest-
ment and efªciency and avoids the much celebrated “tragedy of the 
commons.”146 Rose ultimately concludes that “commerce was clearly 
the central object” of the public trust doctrine and other nineteenth 
century doctrines that created “inherently public property,” and that 
these doctrines are consistent with classical economic property rights 
theory.147 This is because commerce, “of all activities, is ever more 
valuable as more participate.”148 In other words, since “we all become 
exponentially richer as more of us truck, barter, and exchange,” bar-
riers to participation, such as private property, are considered unde-
sirable from an efªciency standpoint.149 Given the focus throughout 
on economics, it is somewhat surprising that Rose concludes her arti-
cle with a discussion of “sociability.”150 This discussion builds on the 
premise that wealth creation was not the sole objective of commerce 
in the nineteenth century; Rose gives several examples of Enlighten-
ment and nineteenth century thinkers speaking to the value of com-
merce as “an educative and socializing institution.”151 Rose goes fur-
ther, stating that “[c]ommerce still seems to be our quintessential 
mode of sociability,” because “[d]espite its appeal to self-interest, it 
also inculcates rules, understandings, and standards of behavior en-
forced by reciprocity of advantage.”152
 Rose then outlines how the same “returns to scale” argument that 
justiªes “inherently public property” as a better means to wealth crea-
tion can be used to justify it as a better means of “socialization,” not-
ing that “perhaps our most important ‘returns to scale’ involve activi-
ties that are somehow sociable or socializing—activities that allow us 
to get along with each other.”153 Identifying free speech as a socializ-
ing institution, Rose sees a connection between the public trust doc-
trine and the public forum doctrine.154 Drawing on Justice Brennan’s 
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147 Id. at 774. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
150 Rose, supra note 16, at 775. 
151 Id. at 775. 
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dissent in Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, Rose states 
that Brennan’s argument that posting signs on telephone polls should 
be allowed “could be stated as a public trust concept: this property is 
needed for the public’s political communication, thus governments 
hold the property in ‘trust’ for this communication, and have only 
limited abilities to divest the public of its trust rights.”155 For Rose, 
“inherently public property” is not a static concept but, rather, it is 
tied to changing notions about what constitutes “valuable socializing 
institutions.”156
 Public parks represent an important nexus between the public 
trust and public forum doctrines. Rose discusses in passing how the 
socialization rationale might apply to protecting public parks for rea-
sons other than commerce and free speech, noting that Frederick 
Law Olmsted had argued that 
recreation can be a socializing and educative inºuence, par-
ticularly helpful for democratic values. Thus rich and poor 
would mingle in parks, and learn to treat each other as 
neighbors. Parks would enhance public mental health, with 
ultimate beneªts to sociability; all could revive from the anti-
social characteristics of urban life under the reªning 
inºuence of the park’s soothing landscape.157
 It is clear that parks are protected in ways that other public uses 
are not. Parks, however, are only one of many valuable uses for public 
lands and their protection is not absolute. Furthermore, their effec-
tiveness in terms of fostering socialization or allowing for recreation 
or fee speech is largely inºuenced by the extent to which they are 
used. While an unused park may still be an asset from an environ-
mental standpoint—giving lungs to the city or helping preserve 
groundwater quality by reducing the amount of impermeable sur-
face—it does not add much in terms of socialization.158 If Rose’s so-
cialization thesis is correct in explaining inherently public property, 
the question then emerges as to how different modes of socialization, 
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such as commerce, free speech, and cultural institutions, should be 
balanced in the city. To a large extent, this is what Boston has been 
grappling with in recent years in deciding how to use the twenty-seven 
acres of surface area reclaimed by the Big Dig. 
 While it would not be accurate to say that parks represent per-
manent or inalienable interests of the public, we can still call them 
“inherently public property.” Government, especially local govern-
ment, should be ever aware of the public’s interest in the land and be 
mindful of how the law protects this interest before proceeding with 
plans to alienate or change the use of publicly-owned property. The 
public interest may be indelible. 
